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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
CONSUMABLES BUDGETING 
By Don A. Nelson 
Manned Spacecraft Center  
SUMMARY 
The consumables budgeting and predicting experience gained in the Apollo develop- 
ment missions and on the first lunar-landing mission a r e  presented. The predicting 
experiences a r e  limited to the propulsion, environmental, and electrical subsystems 
of the command and service module and the lunar module. Basic considerations per- 
taining to subsystem modeling and consumables prediction a r e  presented with recom- 
mendations for advanced systems. 
The development of simplified computer models that simulate the consumables 
systems has been proven to be an invaluable tool for use  by the system engineer in the 
evaluation of the consumables budget. All the system requirements and constraints 
affecting the consumables predictions as wel l  as  the system procedures, the environment 
in which the subsystem will operate, the system-performance data, contingency and 
redline philosophy, crew procedures and modes of operation have to be identified for 
accurate predictions. Design considerations for advance systems should include better 
systems gaging, redundant-system performance modes that are similar to primary 
modes, the capability to transfer consumables that are mutually similar to different 
systems, and more conscientious documentation of performance data during system 
tests. 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance and need of subsystem consumable budgeting and analysis for  
mission planning were recognized early in the Apollo Program. For example, the earth 
orbital spacecraft development flights required a great deal of mission/system com- 
patibility evaluation because systems designed for the lunar environment and opera- 
tions had to be used and verified in the near-earth environment. Trajectory and 
attitude-maneuver techniques, sequences, procedures, and timelines affecting the 
consumables f o r  all the Apollo missions had to be selected that met the test  objectives 
within continually evolving system constraints. Adequate consumable margins had to 
exist for  the nominal flight plan as well as for  the alternate and contingency plans. In 
some cases,  the consumables for  the nominal plan were dependent on whether the mode 
Of Operation would be manual or automated or if the primary o r  the backup subsystem 
would be used. Also, the fact had to be considered that a particular subsystem con- 
sumable (for example, the reaction control system (RCS) propellant) had to be budgeted 
for three different modules, each of which had different requirements and constraints. 
Because of these and other factors, the task of predicting the consumable budgets fo r  a 
lunar-landing mission was very complex. 
The purpose of this report is to document how the consumables-budgeting task was  
accomplished for  the Apollo electrical, environmental, and propulsion subsystems. The 
basic considerations fo r  subsystem modeling and consumables predictions are pre- 
sented together with the consumables-prediction experiences gained and significant 
problems experienced during the development flights and the f i rs t  two lunar-landing 
missions. Recommendations for advanced systems a r e  presented also. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
A consumables analysis is complete when every aspect of the usage is defined. 
Definition of this usage should be consistent for all consumables subsystems to allow 
the spacecraft manager to communicate in a common language with the mission- 
planning engineer and the spacecraft designer. The following items, which make up 
the budget, are used in this report in the context shown. 
1. Loaded o r  capacity: The capacity is that quantity of consumables that is the 
nominal expected load. For batteries, it will represent the nominal expected ampere- 
hour rating. 
2. Unavailable: That quantity of consumables that nominally cannot be consid- 
ered for use in the mission plan is termed "unavailable. v Unavailable consumables 
consist of the sum of defhed nominal unusables, which are as follows. 
a. Trapped and otherwise unavailable consumables 
b. Outage resulting from a mean mixture-ratio imbalance 
C. Gaging, telemetry (TM), and real-time computational e r r o r s  
3. Available for mission: That quantity of nominal-usage consumables remain- 
ing after the unavailable consumables a r e  accounted for is termed "available f o r  the 
mission. (( 
4. Required for mission: That quantity of consumables that is needed in order  
to perform the nominal design or  operational mission is termed "required fo r  mission." 
5. Nominal remaining: That quantity of consumables remaining after considera- 
tion of the unavailable and nominal mission performance requirements is termed "nom- 
inal remaining. '' 
6. Dispersions: That quantity of consumables that involves consideration of the 
dependent and independent variables is called "dispersions. ? (  Some sources to be con- 
sidered a re  variations in loading, flow rate, inert  weight, system performance, 
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. mixture ratio, flight parameters, and crew effect. Usually, sources are rdot sum 
squared; however, in some cases they may be con'sidered as a separate bias. 
7. Pad The pad is that quantity of consumables remaining after all the pre- 
vious considerations have been accounted for. 
8. Contingencies: The contingencies are that quantity of consumables allotted 
for an operational philosophy with low probability of occurrence, or  those events that 
must be budgeted to ensure successful recovery, or both types of events. Contingencies. 
can be related to partial system failure o r  to flight-plan changes that will necessitate 
the use of additional consumables. All candidates for contingency allowance should be 
identified by subsystem and mission designers. 
9. Outage: Propellant outage is that amount of fuel or  oxidizer that remains 
when the other component is depleted. This amount of. either fuel or  oxidizer then is 
not available for maneuvers. 
10. Margin: That quantity of consumables remaining after the highest probability 
of consumables usage has been accounted for is called the "margin. '' 
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Some of the most interesting and difficult tasks and problems experienced in con- 
sumables budgeting occurred in the subsystem mathematical modeling of system- 
equivalent circuit o r  function simplifications and in the ability to identify all the 
requirements affecting the consumable predictions, This section presents the modeling 
requirements that evolved for the propulsion, environmentai, and electrical subsystems 
and the basic considerations that affected the predicting ability of consumables analysts. 
S u bsyste rn Mode I i ng 
Usually, subsystem mathematical models used in digital programs for environ- 
mental, electrical, o r  propulsion system design a re  extremely detailed, cumbersome, 
and require long computer running times. These detailed design programs, however, 
can provide the consumables analyst with simplifying empirical data and analysis tech- 
niques to make the computer programs developed for consumables analyses smaller 
and more versatile. Correlation to flight data can also result in increased fidelity as 
the program progresses.  
Proper evaluation of a system schematic or  diagram of the system components o r  
modules for  its environment, proposed usage, and operational constraints usually re- 
. sulted in further simplifications. An automated plotting capability also had to be im- 
plemented in the consumables-analysis programs so that plots of the predicted budget 
could be generated for documentation, crew charts, and flight-control plotboards. 
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PrQpulsion system. - The design of the propulsion-systems models is based on 
the propellant requirement for translation and rotation. The nominal mission profile 
canbe  computerized easily, given data regarding the ser ies  of burns to fulfill kajectory 
requirements and the proper spacecraft weight. The theoretical ideal rocket equation 
method of RCS propellant budgeting leaves much to be desired regarding the reliability 
of the data that are generated. Inexact information regarding jet-on times, tanked- 
propellant slosh, effects of rotating machinery, effects of center-of-gravity offset, 
effects of body-axis c ross  coupling, manual compared with automatic guidance, and the 
assumption of a rigid body all contribute adversely to actual propellant usage for a par- 
ticular event. 
Environmental control system. - The environmental control system (ECS) mathe- 
matical model is comprised of many different models. Atmospheric-revitalization, 
oxygen-supply, cabin-pressure, heat-transport, and water-management models must 
be integrated s o  that the interactions between these systems may be considered. A 
trajectory and attitude tape is used as input to the incident-heating routine. The cabin 
thermal model is used to calculate the cabin structural heat load. Electrical power 
system (EPS) heat loads a r e  obtained as input from the electrical analysis. With this 
information, the program can predict the consumables usage history for water and met- 
abolic oxygen. 
Electrical power system. - Without an adequate model, an EPS analysis is done by 
simply summing the known loads, applying a fictitious power loss between the source 
(or sources) and the loads, and then subtracting the total energy that is required from 
the energy that is available. However, this is an inadequate method of monitoring the 
EPS of current and future spacecraft. Both the accuracy of the rate  of energy consump- 
tion and, more importantly, the ability to observe the dynamic performance of the entire 
subsystem are lost completely without a computer representation of the electrical con- 
figuration. With a computer model, the consumables analyst has the ability to simulate 
electrical failures and generate data for malfunction identification and recognition. In 
addition, alternate steps can be planned in premission planning if real-time c r i se s  
arise. 
Several vital input parameters a r e  needed to model an EPS subsystem adequately. 
The most important parameter or component to be modeled accurately is the energy 
source of the subsystem. Complete curves defining the voltage-current (V-I) charac- 
terist ics of the source must be included for various operating-temperature ranges in 
the case of conventional power sources. For the case in which more than one source 
powers a spacecraft (for example, fuel cells and batteries), the interplay (load sharing) 
between the individual sources has to be modeled. Then, a complete representative 
power distribution network must be formulated. This network must be as accurate as 
possible to account realistically for energy loss caused by heat dissipation within the 
distribution system. The modeling of the distribution system also must include all vital 
switches and switching configuration s o  that a complete network a r r ay  can be simulated. 
All power demands (loads) must be modeled, whether the loads are simple power ampli- 
f ie rs  o r  more complex motors, the energy demand of which depends upon torque 
requirements. The loads should be accompanied by V-I curves and temperature limita- 
tions where possible. Finally, when all the data just discussed are obtained individually, 
the data must be integrated into a package that represents the entire subsystem. 
4 
Consumables Prediction 
The level of detail or capability to plan an  operationally feasible mission is re- 
lated directly to the level of knowledge about the consumables subsystem. Specifi- 
cally, the consumables analyst must consider the following factors. 
1. Capacity of usable consumables 
2. Operational constraints and philosophies 
3. Planned operations 
4. Performance characteristics 
5. Biases, dispersions, and contingencies 
Capacity. - The capacity of usable consumables is an elusive quantity to define. 
It is a function of loading, trapped propellant, gaging inaccuracy, sampling, and 
operational-usage procedures. Usage procedures require that the consumables for the 
mission plan be predicted before the usable capacity can be determined. An example of 
this situation is the RCS, which has a variable mixture ratio for  the bipropellant con- 
sumables. This ratio varies appreciably from attitude maneuvers that involve the use 
of short pulses to translation maneuvers at constant thrust. As the mixture ratio var- 
ies, so does the amount of remaining oxidizer and fuel. This shift results in an un- 
balanced ratio at the time of propellant depletion. The amount of unbalanced propellant 
then must be classified as unusable or  outage. 
Operational constraints. - Operational constraints define how, when, and in what 
environment the consumables subsystems can be used. The constraints a r e  defined by 
the design specifications, system testing, and flight experience. Once defined properly, 
the constraints help establish mission rules and procedures. However, if operational 
procedures must change, then the constraints must be reviewed to determine if they 
a r e  still valid. 
Planned operations. - The planned operation of the consumables subsystem must 
be known in order  to evaluate the required consumables. Because of redundancy in sys- 
tem design, some consumables subsystems can be operated in different ways. There- 
fore,  the consumables analyst must know the proposed operational procedure of each 
system. Once the planned operational use of the system has been determined, it may 
become necessary to replan the use of the subsystem because of operational constraints 
or the lack of usable consumables. Second only to data accuracy, operational proce- 
dures have the greatest effects on the capability of the consumables analyst to predict 
preflight budgets. For this reason, it is imperative that a close relationship be main- 
tained with the organization that defines the procedures to be used on a particular flight. . 
Performance characteristics. - The system-performance characteristics must be 
known before a consumables budget can be predicted. Usually, performance charac- 
teristics used by the system designer are analytical. Only after the system hardware 
has been built and tested can these analytical analyses be verified. In some cases, the 
hardware test cannot be made until the system is actually flown. Therefore, the uncer- 
tainty in system-performance characteristics is a major contribution to consumables- 
budget-prediction inaccuracies. The scope of performance data available on a system 
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usually dictates the degree to which a system must be analyzed. The accuracy of the 
data is a direct function of the accuracy of the prediction capabilities. Unfortunately, 
performance data usually are obtained as a second-order priority from tests  c’onducted 
to verify the operational range of the system. In some cases, data that could have ben- 
efited the consumables analyst were not even recorded. In other cases, the data were 
recorded but lacked sufficient information on how the test  was conducted. It has been 
proven that the best data are obtained from evaluation of preflight simulations in which 
the flight crew performs the planned operational procedures. 
Biases, dispersions, and contingencies. - The formulation of a consumables 
budget presents some interesting factors that a r e  unique in mission planning. Perhaps 
the category of operational contingencies is the most nebulous. This fact is evident 
when the budgets for the systems are examined for the dispersion and contingency 
(biases) allowances. What quantities are biases and what quantities are dispersions 
sometimes is a matter of definition o r  philosophy. The service module (SM) RCS budget 
is an example of budgeting that has been formulated to  satisfy two requirements: pro- 
pellant for the nominal planned usage and propellant for hypothetical situations that may 
be encountered. Because hypothetical situations (contingencies) a r e  a function of the 
flight plan, their magnitude changes as various phases of the mission are completed. 
The consumable analyst finds that large quantities of propellant are available fo r  mis- 
sion operations after almost all the major events have been completed (such as lunar 
module (LM) rendezvous and docking). Therefore, large quantities of SM RCS propel- 
lant may be returned to earth or  they may be planned for use on scientific experiments 
which would be executed after the command and service module (CSM)/LM rendezvous. 
Assumptions a r e  important in the mathematical formulation of the dispersions 
and contingencies. Usually, dispersions are root sum squared. Contingencies a r e  
considered as independent quantities and a r e  subtracted directly from the remaining 
consumables to define the margins. The most difficult problem in defining dispersions 
is to determine whether the quantity is an independent variable o r  if it can be root sum 
squared with the other contributors. The L M  ascent-stage dispersion is a good example 
for  this problem. The uncertainties for fuel loading, oxidizer loading, trapped fuel, 
trapped oxidizer, specific impulse I thrust and navigation, lift-off weights, and mix- 
ture  ratio are root sum squared to obtain one value for three sigma (30) dispersion. 
In some areas,  the uncertainties just mentioned are themselves considered to be 30 
values. 
SP’ 
P RED I CT I ON D( PER I ENCE 
Some specific prediction experience in the propulsion, the environmental control, 
and the electrical subsystems are presented in this section. The accuracies of the 
consumables predictions for the Apollo 7 to  11 missions are summarized in table I. 
TABLE I. - ACCURACY OF CONSUMABLES PREDICTIONS 
FOR THE APOLLO 7 TO 11 MISSIONS 
Item 
CSM oxygen (02)  
CSM hydrogen (Ha) 
Command module (CM) RCS 
SM RCS 
SPS 
LM descent- stage EPS 
LM ascent-stage EPS 
LM descent-stage water (H20 
LM ascent-stage H 2 0  
LM descent-stage O2 
LM ascent-stage O2 
Descent propulsion system 
DPS) 
Ascent propulsion system 
(APS) 
LM RCS 
Apollo 7 
- 16 
-6 
8 . 7  
6 
4 . 6  
a Deviation, percent 
Apollo 8 
-9 
-7 
1 .8  
-- 
1.2 
Apollo 9 
-3 
- 1 . 5  
2 . 4  
16 
2 . 5  
-20 
- 17 
-6 
-21 
- 10 
-5  
-- 
-- 
-10 
ipollo 10 lpollo 11 
-2 
-2 
N A ~  
-- 
-- 
-5  
2 
-- 
-- 
- 16 
-20 
3 
2 
10 
a A negative deviation is indicative that actual usage was less than was budgeted. 
Where no deviation is indicated, actual usage is within 1 percent of the budget. The 
deviation percentage was computed by use of the following formula. 
actual usage - predicted usage 
usable consumable 
bNo data were available on the CM RCS usage during the Apollo 11 entry because 
the data-storage equipment was  off. 
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Reaction Control System Propulsion 
Service module. - The SM RCS has an expected loading of 1342 pounds of propel- 
lant; however, only 1220 pounds are available for mission planning. This difference 
represents 9 percent of the total propellant load. A s  indicated in table 11, gaging inac- 
curacy accounts for  6 percent of the total loaded propellant being unavailable. Gaging 
is based on a pressure-volume-temperature relationship. The accuracy of the gage on 
board the spacecraft is ? l o  percent, provided the astronaut has a nomograph to use to 
correct  gage-reading temperature effects. Without the nomograph, the maximum on- 
board propellant-gaging-system e r r o r  increases to 15  percent at the 0 percent usable- 
propellant-remaining point. 
TABLE II. - PROPELLANT-LOADING DATA FOR THE 
SERVICE MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
Description 
Propellant 
required, 
lb 
Expected loading 
Initial outage caused by loading mixture ratio 
Total trapped 
Gaging inaccuracy 
Deliverable 
-- 
15.6 
26. 4 
80.4 
I 
I -- 
- 
Propellant 
remaining, 
lb 
1342.4 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1220.0 
Another major contributor of unusable propellant is the mixture-ratio effect. The 
quantity of propellant outage predicted for  loading is shown in table 11. Additional outage 
for  mixture-ratio shift is a function of the mission plan. On the Apollo 11 mission, a 
mixture-ratio outage of approximately 6 percent unusable of total loaded propellant was 
noted. Advance missions probably will involve larger mixture-ratio outages because of 
an increased amount of CSM-alone attitude maneuvering that will necessitate the use of 
minimum impulse. 
The ullage- maneuver requirements and the LM-rescue allowances also have ap- 
preciable effects on the consumable budgets. The ullage-maneuver requirements a r e  
defined by the time required to settle the service propulsion system (SPS) propellant 
in the sump tanks. The maneuvers are required only after the SPS propellant has been 
depleted in the storage tanks. For  critical situations, the SPS can be started without 
an ullage maneuver. The LM-rescue allowance is incorporated into the mission red- 
line and is defined as a certain quantity of usable propellant that must be remaining 
before rendezvous. 
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Originally, the SM RCS tanks were designed to contain 790 pounds of usable pro- 
pellant. Budgets for the design reference mission were estimated at approximately 
250 pounds, which gives a very good margin for contingency and dispersion allowances. 
In November 1967, the Apollo Configuration Control Board defined the budget to be 
409 pounds for the nominal Apollo 11 lunar mission with a rescue allowancesf 
520 pounds. These requirements made it necessary to add extra propellant tanks to 
provide 1220 pounds of usable propellant. However, the predicted budget continued to 
increase as the mission procedures became better defined. The final budget for the 
Apollo 11 mission was predicted to be 590 pounds, more than a 100-percent increase 
over that defined for the design reference mission. The actual usage during the mis- 
sion was 580 pounds, which is representative of a prediction e r ro r  of 2 percent when 
all procedures have been defined. 
The SM RCS budgets have continued to increase, and it is expected that these 
budgets will reach a usage level of 800 pounds for  the Apollo 15 mission. The increase 
is because of the scientific experiments performed on the mission. The SM RCS budget 
predictions for the Apollo 8 and 11 missions were in agreement with the flight data. The 
Apollo 7 SM RCS predictions were 6 percent less than the actual requirements. During 
the braking phase of rendezvous, 35 pounds more propellant was  consumed than had 
been predicted, and approximately 20 pounds of propellant were consumed during the 
period of the fifth SPS burn (the cause was not determined). The Apollo 9 SM RCS pro- 
pellant budget prediction was 16 percent less than the actual requirements. Significant 
deviations occurred in the following phases. 
1. Transposition and docking 
2. Undocking for rendezvous 
3. Rendezvous 
4. LM jettison 
In contrast, the Apollo 10 SM RCS propellant usage consistently was above the budgeted 
profile. The predictions were 21 percent more than the actual requirements and can be 
attributed to the following causes. 
1. Improved passive-thermal-control mode 
2. Efficient execution of transposition and docking maneuvers 
3. Midcourse correction budgeted but not required 
4. Efficient execution of translunar navigation sightings 
5. Efficient execution of docking and postdocking activities 
Lunar module reaction control system, - Fifteen percent of the loaded propellant 
fo r  the LM RCS is unusable for mission planning: 3 percent is mixture-ratio outage, 
6 percent is for gaging, and 6 percent is trapped. Increases in total percentage unus- 
ables compared with the 9 percent for the SM RCS result primarily from the propellant 
trapped in the lines to the thrusters. The CSM has a quad arrangement with tanks for 
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each four sets of thrusters, whereas the LM RCS has a central location fo r  propellant 
tanks and has long lines to the four sets of thrusters. This loss in LM RCS usable pro- 
pellant is offset by not having to account for quad imbalance dispersion. The usable 
propellant is defined in table III. Unlike the SM RCS, the LM system has the capability 
of using propellant from the APS main propellant tanks. To ensure that the propellants 
are settled properly in  the APS tanks, the RCS must perform an ullage maneuver to 
prevent helium, which may be trapped below the propellant in the APS tanks, from be- 
ing ingested through the interconnecting lines to the RCS thrusters. 
Loaded 
Trapped 
TABLE 111. - USABLE-PROPELLANT DATA FOR THE 
-- 
40.6 
LUNAR MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
Usable 
Description 
-- 
Propellant 
required, I lb 
Gaging inaccuracy and loading tolerance 
Mixture-ratio uncertainty 
39.5 
17.0 
Propellant 
remaining, 
lb 
(a) 
633.0 
592.4 
552.9 
535.9 
535.9 
a Experience in loading is indicative of an e r r o r  of less than 1 percent. 
No propellant allowances are made for  contingencies. However, dispersions asso- 
ciated with man-in-the-loop allowances in the nominal budget off set all considerations 
fo r  system dispersions. Therefore, dispersions and contingencies are not considered 
in the overall consumables budget. 
Initial estimations of the operational requirements by the systems designer were 
indicative that the lunar-landing propellant budget was approximately 392 pounds, con- 
siderably higher when compared with the 300-pound budget that was planned for  the 
Apollo 1 2  mission. Major differences in  the budget are in  the propellant usage esti- 
mated initially for attitude control during descent propulsion system burns, landing 
requirements, and propellant required for  the rendezvousing of the ascent stage with 
the CSM. This trend of requiring less than predicted is different f rom that experienced 
fo r  the SM RCS; however, the operational modes of the LM RCS a r e  limited to perform- 
ing two tasks: landing and rendezvousing with the CSM. Predictions were also im- 
proved considerably when the consumables analyst monitored the flight crew during 
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their simulations. By monitoring the flight crew, the consumables analyst was aware 
of the techniques and procedures which that particular crew may have elected to follow 
for its mission. In fact, the major contributor to the improvement in propellant pre- 
dictions have been monitoring flight crews during simulations. 
The history of the LM RCS budgets has never been indicative that this system had 
marginal propellant reserves.  Propellant margins always have been approximately 
20 percent of the total loaded propellant. This allowance has been considered sufficient 
to assist in any anomalies, such as landing-site redesignations and RCS cycling during 
DPS burns. Also, the capability of the system to transfer propellant from the APS main 
tanks has influenced this conservatism significantly. 
The LM RCS propellant budget was conservative by 10 percent for the Apollo 9 
mission. For the Apollo 10 mission, the LM RCS usage reflected the control-mode 
problem that occurred immediately after staging, resulting in excessive consumption 
at that point. During the remainder of the Apollo 10 rendezvous, the actual propellant 
consumption was less than was budgeted. The increased hover time caused a 10-percent 
increase in LM RCS propellant for the Apollo 11 mission. 
Command module reaction control system. - Definition of the usable propellant 
for the CM RCS has not been quite as extensive as for .the other reaction control sys- 
tems. Unusable propellant represents almost 15 percent of the loaded propellant. As 
in case of the LM RCS, trapped propellant is a major contributor of unusable propellant 
because the propellant is transferred from the storage tanks by means of long lines to 
the thrusters.  The CM RCS is completely redundant, having two sets of propellant 
tanks and thrusters.  
The propellant required for operational use on lunar missions is only 17 percent 
of the total loaded propellant, which leaves approximately 68 percent of the propellant 
loaded as margin. The main reason for this excessive margin is that the system is 
completely redundant in order to ensure that proper attitudes can be maintained at all 
times during hyperbolic-entry velocities. Nominal usage has been within 10 percent of 
usages predicted for the actual flights. However, there is no consideration for offload- 
ing propellant f rom the system. The CM RCS predictions deviated less than 10 percent 
fo r  the Apollo 7 to 10 missions. Flight data a r e  not available for the Apollo 11 mission. 
Mai n P rop u I sion 
Service propulsion system. - The percentage of unusable consumables for the SPS 
is 1 .5  percent of the total loaded propellant. This percentage is a magnitude of 10 - -  
smal le i  than those discussed previously for  the reaction control systems, partly 
because the system designers must be concerned with the weight penalties imposed by 
large quantities of unusable propellant. Approximately 1 percent of the unusable pro- 
pellant is attributed to trapped propellant; the remainder is attributed to outage and 
unbalance meter use of the propellant utilization (PU) system. Trapped propellant is 
located in the engine feedline, retention reservoirs, transfer line, and in the form of 
vapor. Trapped propellant weighs approximately 440 pounds. The amount of unusable 
propellant caused by outage is fairly small when the fact that the PU system is opera- 
ting correctly is considered. However, inaccuracies in the gaging system can result in 
failure to identify when an outage is occurring until after the capability of the system to 
correct  the outage has been exceeded. 
- 
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Premission SPS propellant predictions were within 5 percent of the actual require- 
ments for the Apollo 7 to 11 missions. In general, the larger deviations were the result  
of actual burns being longer than were planned premission. 
Descent propulsion system. - The DPS unusable consumables comprise approxi- 
mately 1.2 percent of the total loaded propellant. As in the case of the SPS, the major 
contributor of unusables is that propellant which is trapped and unavailable. The other 
contributors are outage and gaging uncertainties. Propellant allotted for  contingencies 
and dispersions also must be considered as unusable for mission-planning purposes. 
Dispersion allowances represent approximately 2 percent of the total loaded propellant, 
accounting for I thrust, weight, and mixture-ratio uncertainties. These values are 
root sum squared to account for the total contribution to the unusables. Other unusa- 
bles that must be accounted for are those defined as contingencies. Contingency pro- 
pellant allowances were made for engine valve-pair malfunctions, redesignation of 
landing site, and low-level sensor uncertainty. Unlike the dispersions, these values 
were not root sum squared, but were considered as separate occurrences (biases). 
SP’ 
There are two major constraints that the consumables analyst must consider in 
planning DPS burns. First, because the pressurization system involves supercritical 
helium, a considerable period of time is required after loading to reach the operational 
pressures.  When this system has reached operational pressure,  a consumables analyst 
must concentrate on the duration of the DPS burns so that the integrity of the pressure 
system will not be violated. Another major consideration is that the variable-thrust 
DPS is equipped with an ablative nozzle. Burn durations must be monitored to ensure 
that the nozzle will not be burned through. 
The primary purpose of the DPS engine is to perform the descent burn to the lunar 
surface. However, a contingency situation could require that the DPS make the trans- 
earth injection burn. Nominally, the DPS will require a velocity increment AV 
of approximately 6600 fps for LM landing. However, if  the astronaut assumes manual 
control of the spacecraft, performs a site redesignation, o r  extends the hover time, 
this AV budget would increase; therefore, these items have been included in the nom- 
inal budget considerations. In fact, the budget allows for an additional 2 minutes of 
hover time when the LM has reached an altitude of 500 feet. 
The DPS propellant predictions for  the Apollo 9 and 10 missions were in agree- 
ment with flight data within less than 1 percent. However, during the Apollo 11 mis- 
sion, excessive propellant usage was directly attributable to the manual maneuvering 
that w a s  performed in descent-guidance-program 66. This program was entered at 
approximately 400 feet to avoid a large crater .  Until that time, propellant usage was 
nominal. Allowances fo r  manual hover and site redesignation were in the preflight 
budget, but were not considered part of nominal usage. The Apollo 11 deviation was 
only 3 percent. 
Ascent propulsion system. - As is the case  for the other major propulsion sys- 
tems, the unusable propellant for the APS consists of trapped and outage propellant. 
The values represent approximately 1 . 2  percent of the total loaded propellant (approxi- 
mately 63 pounds). An additional 1 . 2  percent is allotted f o r  dispersions, and contingen- 
c ies  comprise almost 2 percent. Contingencies are composed of engine valve-pair 
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malfunction, out-of-plane corrections, and RCS balance couples requirements. Con- 
sideration of all the unusables results in an allowance of approximately 4 percent of the 
total loaded propellant. The APS propellant predictions were within 1 percent of the 
flight requirements for the Apollo 9 to 11 missions. 
H2, Ib 
58.60 
2 .32  (4 percent) 
1.50  ( 2 . 5  perc'ent) 
54.78 
Environmental Systems 
02'  1b 
660.20 
13.00 (2 percent) 
17.50 ( 2 . 5  percent) 
629.70 
Command and service module cryogenics. - The CSM ECS and EPS are integrated 
to use compatible consumables for fuel-cell operation and life support. Cryogenic hy- 
drogen and oxygen are the consumables for the EPS; their unusables are presented in 
table IV to define the planning allowance. No allowances were required for sampling, 
loading uncertainties, and system leakage. 
TABLE IV. - UNUSABLES DATA FOR THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
Description 
Total loaded 
Less residual 
Less instrumentation e r ro r  
Available for mission planning 
For  the Apollo 7 mission, the oxygen and hydrogen deviations from the premission 
predictions can be attributed to the following circumstances. 
1. A 30-pound venting allowance was  used in preflight for  oxygen, but the tank 
did not vent in flight. 
sion predictions, but the actual usage rate was approximately 0.36  lb/hr. 
2. The specification ECS oxygen-usage rate of 0.53  lb/hr was used for premis- 
3. Cyclic components (heaters and so forth) cycled less than was anticipated, 
causing a decreased oxygen and hydrogen EPS requirement. , 
For the Apollo 8 mission, the oxygen and hydrogen deviations from the premis- 
sion predictions can be attributed to the following circumstances. 
1. The ECS oxygen-usage rate was less  than the specification value. 
2. The total fuel-cell current level was 5 to 7 amperes less than the premission 
predictions, causing the predicted requirements for oxygen and hydrogen to be higher 
than the actual flight data. 
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The deviation in fuel-cell current was caused by uncertainty in  equipment duty cycles 
and by the conservative values fo r  equipment power levels given in  the Spacecraft 
Operational Data Book. 
Descent-stage 
H20,  lb De s c rip t ion 
The Apollo 9 CSM oxygen and hydrogen requirements were within 3 percent of the 
predictions, which was considered quite acceptable. The Apollo 1 0  CSM oxygen pre- 
dictions were less than 1 percent from the actual nominal requirements. However, ap- 
proximately 167 hours after lift-off, fuel cell 1, which was malfunctioning, was purged 
with hydrogen. Difficulty in terminating the hydrogen flow resulted in  a 6-percent de- 
viation between actual and premission predicted hydrogen usage. The CSM oxygen and 
hydrogen requirements for the Apollo 11 mission were both 2 percent less than pre- 
dicted, probably because of the loss  of an oxygen tank heater element plus a probable 
reduced RCS heater duty cycle. 
Lunar module water. - The LM ECS water budget (table V) has 8 percent unusables 
for the descent stage and 5 percent unusables for the ascent stage. The tank-loading 
uncertainty is based on telemetry- and gaging-inaccuracy e r r o r s  because the telemetry- 
measuring device is the one used when the tank is loaded. Because the water fill source 
that is used for the ascent and descent stages is the same, no samples were taken from 
the ascent stage. In the future, sampling quantities may be increased to 15 pounds; to 
account for this additional requirement, the extra sampling quantity will be loaded. 
Ascent -stage 
H20,  lb 
TABLE V. - LUNAR MODULE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
WATER BUDGET 
Loaded 
Sampling 
Residual 
Loading uncertainty 
252.0 85.0 
12.0 (a3. 6 percent) -- 
5.2 ( a ~ .  5 percent) 
9 .7  (a2. 9 percent) 
1 .6  (1.9 percent) 
2 .6  (3.1 percent) 
a Based on a maximum tank loading of 333 pounds. 
The LM ascent- and descent-stage water predictions for  the Apollo 9 mission 
deviated significantly from the actual flight data, primarily because of real-time flight- 
plan changes, causing a decrease in  actual usage. The Apollo 1 0  and 11 water predic- 
tions were in  agreement with the flight data. 
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Lunar module oxygen. - The LM ECS oxygen budget is the one exception to the 
unusable range of 5 to 8 percent. With its redundancy and small size, the ascent oxy- 
Description 
Loaded 
Residual 
Loading uncertainty 
System leakage 
Available for mission 
1 
gen system presents an unusable allowance of 17 percent. Close examination of the- 
data in table VI is indicative that rounding off these small quantities has introduced ex- 
cessive percentage errors .  The accuracy in the calculation o r  measurement of these 
small quantities is another factor that increases the magnitude of e r ror .  
2 .4  
0.1 ( 4 . 2  percent) 
0.1 (4 .2  percent) 
0.2 (8 .4  percent) 
2 .0  
TABLE VI. - LUNAR MODULE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM OXYGEN DATA 
2.4  
0.1 ( 4 . 2  percent) 
0.1 (4 .2  percent) 
0 . 2  ( 8 . 4  percent) 
2 . 0  
Descent 02, lb 
4 8 . 0  
0 . 8  (1.6 percent) 
1.5 (3.1 percent) 
1.3 (2 .7  percent) 
44.4 
Ascent 1 02, lb I Ascent 2 02, lb 
The Apollo 9 to 11 LM oxygen-usage predictions were higher than were the actual 
requirements because the LM cabin-oxygen leak rate was much less than’ the specifica- 
tion value. The actual leak rate was  approximately 0.05 lb/hr  compared with the spec- 
ification rate of 0.2 lb/hr. 
Elect rica I S u bsy ste m s 
Lunar module electrical power subsystem. - The EPS provides all the power that 
is necessary f o r  the LM to complete a mission. Basically, the EPS consists of four 
descent batteries (batteries 1 to 4), two ascent batteries (batteries 5 and 6), a deadface 
relay box, two inverters, two alternating-current buses, and two main direct-current 
buses. 
Electrical power system trapped unusables for the Apollo spacecraft batteries 
are generally undefined. The batteries are given an initial rating or  capacity, which is 
actually a performance capability guaranteed by the battery manufacturer. Other unusa- 
bles that are accounted fo r  are based on a lack of Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) 
coverage. This allowance covers those periods (usually on the back side of the moon) 
in which the usage rate is unknown. Also, an allowance is made for the uncertainty in 
the amount of power the equipment draws, which is usually approximately 2 percent of 
the total energy used. The unusables considered for a typical lunar mission a r e  given 
in tables V n  and VIII. The LM EPS usage planned for a typical lunar mission is shown 
in tables M and X. 
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TABLE VII. - LUNAR MODULE DESCENT-STAGE UNUSABLES DATA 
FOR A TYPICAL LUNAR MISSION 
Description 
Initial capacity 
Unusable based on lack of MSFN coverage 
Telemetry unusable 
Dispersion unusable 
Required power, 
A-hr 
-- 
5 
74 
23 
Remaining power, 71
1600 
1595 
1521 
1498 
TABLE VIII. - LUNAR MODULE ASCENT STAGE UNUSABLES DATA 
FOR A TYPICAL LUNAR MISSION 
Required power, Remaining power, 
A-hr A-hr 
Initial capacity -- 592 
Unusables based on lack of MSFN coverage 3 5 89 
TM unusables 13 576 
Dispersion 5 571 
Description 
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TABLE M. - LUNAR MODULE DESCENT STAGE ELECTRICAL 
POWER SYSTEM USAGE DATA 
Description 
Required through landing 
Required for surface time 
Total mission requirement 
Total usable margin 
Required power, 
A- h r  
311 
794 
1105 
-- 
Remaining power, 
A- h r  
1187 
393 
-- 
393 
TABLE x. - LUNAR MODULE ASCENT STAGE 
POWER SYSTEM USAGE DATA 
Description 
Required through docking 
Required through impact 
Total mission requirement 
Total usable margin 
Required power, 
A-hr 
246 
175 
42 1 
-- 
ELECTRICAL 
Remaining power, 
A- h r  
325 
150 
-- 
150 
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The Apollo 9 LM EPS descent- and ascent-stage consumables predictions were 
approximately 20 percent higher than the actual requirements. The following factors 
were causes of the deviations. 
1. The actual RCS heater duty cycle was l e s s  than that used for  premission 
computations. 
2. The forward-window heaters were turned off during extravehicular activity 
and rendezvous for the actual mission but were left on in  the premission calculations. 
3. Other heater duty cycles, such as abort sensor assembly heaters, inertial 
measurement unit heater, landing-radar heater, and rendezvous-radar heater, aver- 
aged less than 2 amperes during the actual mission compared with 4.5 amperes  for  the 
premission predictions. 
. 
4. The total time during which the LM descent stage was active was reduced by 
1 .5  hours during the flight. 
The Apollo 10 descent and ascent premission EPS predictions deviated 3 percent o r  less 
from the flight data. Primarily, the real-time departures from the premission flight 
plan with respect to the duration of the LM housekeeping day, load sharing between the 
ascent and descent batteries, and a delay in the parallelling procedures were responsi- 
ble for the deviations. The Apollo 11 LM EPS premission consumables predictions 
were within 5 percent of the flight requirements. The deviations appeared to be the 
result of using a slightly high RCS heater duty cycle for the premission predictions. 
Command and service module electrical subsystem. - The CSM EPS is comprised 
of cryogenic fuel cells, entry and postlanding batteries, and pyrotechnic batteries. Two 
pyrotechnic batteries are used to fire ordnance devices. These batteries are isolated 
from the res t  of the EPS; however, any of the three entry and postlanding batteries can 
be used to initiate pyrotechnic circuits. No consumables budgets were required for the 
pyrotechnic batteries. 
In budgeting for the cryogenics consumables requirements, the consumables ana- 
lyst must first define the quantity in the tank at lift-off. After the fuel cells  are pres- 
surized, cryogenics use must be started o r  an overpressure condition will occur. TO 
prevent overpressure, the tanks must be vented o r  the cell  purged for impurity buildup. 
Additional cryogenics are required for prelaunch electrical-power checkout. Flight 
cryogenics requirements a r e  based on the spacecraft electrical loads. Electrical loads 
are defined in a manner similar to the LM/EPS analysis previously defined. 
In predicting the cryogenics usage, the consumables analyst also must consider 
the mission redline. Generally, redlines have been defined as the minimum quantity 
of cryogenics necessary to complete an electrical powered-down return to the primary 
landing area on a single tank from the most cri t ical  point in  the mission. Budgeting 
experience was reported in the environmental section. 
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' RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADVANCED SYSTEMS 
Gaging 
An examination of table XI indicates that one area in definite need of improvement 
is the consumables allotment for unusables. The allotment ranges from 1 percent to 
15 percent. The low of 1 percent is misleading because this represents a DPS unusable 
TABLE XI. - APOLLO CONSUMABLES REQUIREMENTS 
System 
LM RCS 
S M R C S  . 
CM RCS 
CSM SPS 
LM APS 
LM DPS 
2 LM descent-stage 0 
LM ascent-stage O2 
LM descent-stage H 0 2 
LM ascent-stage H 0 
CSM O2 
CSM H2 
LM descent-stage batteries 
LM ascent-stage batteries 
CSM batteries 
2 
a NA = not applicable. 
Unusable 
consumable, 
percent 
15 
9 
15 
1.5 
1.2 
1. 1  
7.5 
17 
8 
5 
5 
6. 5 
Quantity 
required 
for nominal 
unar mission, 
percent 
65 
68 
17 
90 
93 
93 
65 
23 
50 
49 
75 
80 
69 
42 
86 
Nominal 
remaining, 
percent 
20 
23 
68 
7.5 
5. 8 
5.9 
27.5 
60 
42 
46 
20 
13.5 
31 
58 
14 
Biases and 
iispersions, 
percent 
(a) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
4.2 
2.8 
4.0 
3. 0 
'2. 0 
11 
7 
4 
1.9 
6.4 
3.0 
4 
~~ 
Mar gin, 
iercent 
20 
23 
68 
3.3 
3.0 
1.9 
24.5 
57 
31 
39 
16 
11. 6 
24.6 
55.0 
1 0. 
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of approximately 170 pounds, a considerable mass to be carr ied to the moon and not 
used. The errors that are associated with gaging are the primary a r e a  for improve- 
ment in the unusables for all consumables systems. If the gaging e r r o r s  can be im- 
proved, a major step will have been achieved. Gaging e r r o r s  were recognized in the 
early design of Apollo systems. A nuclear system was planned that would improve the 
gaging prediction for  the reaction control systems. However, this design was unfeasi- 
ble, and the old pressure-volume-temperature gaging method was adapted. Gaging 
e r r o r  exists not only for the ground-based calculation, but a lso is found in onboard crew 
read-outs. Some onboard e r r o r s  a r e  so  large that crew charts must be prepared to 
correct them to a 10-percent accuracy. Better gaging for propulsion systems would 
eliminate other types of unusables, such as mixture-ratio shifts. Gaging inaccuracy 
problems a r e  not limited to the propulsion system but occur in the operation Of all of 
the consumables system. 
Redundant Operation Modes 
In the interest of safety, the Apollo spacecraft was designed to include redundant. 
systems. Initially, the systems were referred to as primary and secondary systems. 
After these systems were developed, it was discovered that the secondary systems had 
primary functions. As  a result, the flight crew was given a choice as to which system 
they preferred, a choice that sometimes was made after the flight had begun. The major 
objection to this operation is that, generally, the consumables ra tes  a r e  different be- 
tween the primary and secondary systems, which makes it very difficult to predict con- 
sumables budgets. For example, there are more than 20 ways to translate the CSM, 
and each procedure results in a different ra te  of consumables expenditure. 
Con sumables Transfer 
The transfer of consumables from one system to another has been proven benefi- 
cial  for the LM propulsion systems. The crossfeed and interconnect have eliminated or 
minimized problems of propellant management. This solution could have applications 
for advanced systems that use the same consumable (fuel cells and oxygen-hydrogen 
propulsion). 
To transfer consumables f rom different space vehicles presents a compatibility 
problem. This problem was experienced on the Apollo 13 mission with the lithium hy- 
droxide canisters. Commonality should be considered a goal for all spacecraft oper- 
ating together. Sizes of hoses, electrical loads, materials, and many other facts 
should be considered for possible exchanges in an emergency. Battery chargers and 
inverters should be a first-priority compatibility problem. 
System Performance 
The actual performance that a system achieves in flight is rarely known. Telem- 
etry data have been very good; however, the system engineer or  consumables analyst 
st i l l  does not know what the exact performance of his system wil l  be, especially in the 
case of the main propulsion systems. Generally, it can be determined whether the 
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system performed within its specification limits, but actual performance of the system 
usually remains a mystery within the accuracy limits of the telemetry for expendable 
systems. 
Usually, system performance is sized for  a specific mission. This method of 
sizing is required in order to give all the system designers the same design goal. How- 
ever, it is recommended strongly that, at some phase in the system design, proposed 
alternate missions be investigated. In case a particular alternate mission o r  a mission 
required for systems checkout has a questionable consumables margin, possible changes 
could be made before the system is fabricated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the consumables-analysis experience gained in the Apollo development and 
early lunar-landing missions, the following conclusions a r e  stated. 
1. The consumables analyst must define the consumable available for usage and 
must know when the system is to be used, in what mode of operation it will  be used, and 
what constraints must be observed. 
2. The development of simplified computer models that simulate the consumables 
systems has proven to be an invaluable tool for  use by the system engineer in the evalua- 
tion of the consumables budgets. Also, these models have been extremely useful for 
conducting analyses for management-proposed system redesign. Proper evaluation of 
the consumables subsystem schematic usually resulted in methods for further reducing 
the modeling requirements and computation time. 
3. Usually, performance data on the system were obtained as a second-order 
priority in verifying the operational capability of the system. 
4. System procedures and the environment in which the subsystems will operate 
have to be established and identified. 
5. All the system requirements, constraints, and assumptions affecting the con- 
sumable predictions need to be identified. 
6. Monitoring flight-crew techniques during simulations resulted in major im- 
Prove.ments in  propellant-usage predictions. 
ceptable. Other systems, such as main propulsion systems, necessitate a prediction 
accuracy of 1 percent to prevent excessive weight problems. 
7. For some consumables, a system-prediction accuracy of 10 percent is ac- 
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8. Design considerations to be made for advance systems are better systems- 
quantity gaging, redundant system-performance modes similar to the primary mode, 
the capability to transfer consumables that are mutually similar to different systems, 
and a more conscientious documentation of performance data during system tests. 
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